States of Emergency have been used widely to undermine and
overthrow democratic electoral governments, and also to attack political
opponents of unpopular autocrats. But they also may indicate that popular
movements and established government bodies outside of the executive office are
making headway in opposing autocratic or oligarchic, anti-democratic
leadership. The effects of a declaration of a state of emergency depend on
those political agents that are involved in the struggle for democracy, and how
they respond to such declarations.
Declarations of a national
emergency have a long history, and have been used widely around the world for
political gain by narrow interests. The Italian political theorist Giorgio
Agamben has discussed such efforts of the
head of state to rule outside the law, what he calls the state of
exception. A brief overview of the use of declarations of a national state of
emergency in the twenty-first century will help us get some sense of how
political bodies committed to democracy can respond to this threat.
In the past decade or two, national states of emergency have
been declared by autocrats and oligarchs, generals and military councils in
order to remove elected governments, as seen in Bangladesh
in 2007, Myanmar
in 2012, and Thailand
in 2014. In these cases, the
declaration is deployed as part of the arsenal of weapons to destroy electoral
systems and replace them with autocracy.
Before the recent declaration
by President Trump of a national state of emergency in the United States, legal
commentators were already concerned that the American President was not
willing to submit to the established rule of law. With the declaration of a state of emergency,
Trump has greatly expanded the considerable range of powers that he is granted
by the laws that make such a declaration legal, as discussed in last
month’s post. As Trump’s poll numbers remain low and the 2020 election
approaches, we will see whether Trump uses those special powers to promote his
own election or even attempts to remain in office by other means.
With Trump’s declaration, the U.S. joins the small number of
G20 countries that have used such declarations for political purposes:
Argentina and Turkey. Among OECD countries, only Turkey has a history of using
such declarations to pursue unpopular policies and consolidate political power.
States of emergency also have a history of being used by
autocratic, unelected governments to oppose popular movements pressuring them
to change policies or attempting to remove them from political power, as in Argentina
in 2001, Paraguay
in 2002, Nepal
in 2005, and Ecuador
in 2006. In several of these cases, popular opposition proved to be strong
enough to withstand the impact of the national state of emergency, and leaders
were forced from power within a year or two after the declaration.
In recent years the national emergency has been a weapon
used by elected leaders to attack opposition political movements, court
decisions opposing elected leaders, and even opposition parties, as in Pakistan
in 2007, Kyrgystan
in 2010, and Turkey
in 2016. In some cases (as in
Turkey), the declaration has successfully marginalized opposing organizations.
However, in others (as in Kyrgystan) the state of emergency was not effective
in weakening opposition to autocracy, and the leader fell from power.
In the United States there was some objection to Trump’s
declaration of a state of emergency by a few commentators, but almost zero
public opposition by social movements or political parties. Perhaps the
citizens of the United States are so accustomed to electoral democracy, with
its many compromises of popular will, that they did not feel moved to object to
the establishment of another beachhead of autocratic governance. Since there is
little public education in the United States about the high stakes of such a
clear threat to electoral practices, perhaps it is understandable that there
was so little popular opposition.
These historical uses of the declaration of states of
emergency show why many supporters of democracy find these declarations
problematic. But they also show that even when a political leader wields the
cudgel of an emergency declaration, they still may be forced from office if popular
opposition remains vocal and strong through the process.
