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Showing posts with label Derrida. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Derrida. Show all posts

August 31, 2020

Defend Democracy: Building Social Groups to Strengthen Democratic Power

                The warnings about a surge towards autocracy in the United States, Europe, Turkey, and the Philipines have turned from a steady stream to a flood in the past year. But there is much we can do to build stronger centers for democratic power.

Democracy comes from the people, not from governments. So organized communities can hold governments accountable and pressure them to become more democratic.  Popular movements successfully pressing for democratic practices and freedoms fill the past half century of Latin America’s recent history in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and beyond.  Protestors in Belarus this summer have shown how popular protest can pressure elected leaders who put their personal interests above those of the country. Successful popular movements have overthrown presidents in Burma, Argentina, and Egypt and changed policies in many other nations.

               The study of weaknesses in autocracy by Gene Sharp, who explored resistance movements in India, Panama, Poland, Chile, and Thailand, found multiple centers for democratic power. These centers of power include not only government bodies but also many non-governmental groups and institutions. While many are familiar with major non-governmental institutions that claim to promote democracy, such as mass media, political parties, watchdog organizations, unions, churches, and economic bodies, not all recognize the importance for democracy of less formal social groups.

Increased involvement in such informal social groups is an important way that we can strengthen the structural base for a free democratic society. Neighborhood councils, sports clubs, student groups, cultural associations, musical groups, or other common interest groups: any group that knits people together in ways that can be activated when democracy needs to be defended. Such groups might form in urban (reading groups; community garden groups), suburban (sewing groups; youth groups; permaculture groups), or rural settings (small farmer associations; cooking clubs).

Many such groups have formed during the pandemic as communities develop mutual aid resources for meeting needs that governments won't address. The Movement for Black Lives and other supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement actively bring people together in new ways to practice joyful ways of being together.

Getting to know others in these group settings resists autocracy because it brings people together. Authoritarians must divide to conquer. So building relationships with those unlike yourself weakens authoritarian attempts to divide.

Participating in informal groups is also an important tactic for keeping democracies healthy, in the view of the historian Tim Snyder who has studied Nazi groups in Europe.  Put your body in unfamiliar places with unfamiliar people is one of his twenty points for protecting democracy. Another one is “stay in touch with your surroundings, break down unnecessary social barriers, and come to understand whom you should and should not trust.” Building trust with people you do not customarily befriend is an important part of defending democracy.

Protecting institutions that counterbalance executive power or bring hidden activities to light is also important in protecting democracy.  Supporting an independent judiciary, investigative journalism, and other pillars of democratic governance will strengthen democracy.

When democracy suddenly seems at risk these organizations will emerge as needed, or they can be formed before needed to defend democracy. When Pakistan tried to force courts to support the government, lawyers came out in force  in 2007 to keep the courts independent. When economic experts in Argentina tried to close the banks so that the World Bank could be paid its debts, a massive explosion of neighborhood councils and street organizations emerged (complete with homemade musical accompaniment) in late 2001. Many of these organizations remain at work to exert pressure on their government to remain democratic to this day.

When subjects do not obey, rulers have no power. While activists in some thirty countries have used this approach to resist dictators and overthrow oligarchs, theorists such as Michel Foucault have found that power is not monopolized by those who seem to have it. Jacques Derrida argued that centralized institutions like governments depend on a sleight of hand to trick people into giving up their own agency.

If autocrats do take power, Gene Sharp and others will still be around to help those of us who want democracy back. There is even a phone app on Sharp’s work! And there are many other ways to advocate for democracy when an elected national leader goes rogue and tries to turn an electoral government into a single-party autocracy.

Social division is an autocrat’s best friend. So joining groups with new friends and building trust knits society across divisions. Gayatri Spivak invites us to practice democracy by listening effectively to those with whom we do not identify, so we can build trust with subalterns over the long term.

Friendships and organizations can reach across national borders. So “Learn from others in other countries. Keep up your friendships abroad, or make new friends abroad” in the words again of Tim Snyder. Reaching out internationally builds bridges from the local to the global, work that may provide resources if needed.

These actions will hinder the one-party state, which often emerge from two-party or multi-party electoral systems. Remember that many dictators were once brought to power by elections: Duvalier in HaitI; Ahmed Sèkou Tourè in Guinea; Mussolini in Italy; Hitler in Germany.

History will show whether elected leaders active today will prove to be autocrats in the making: Duterte in the Philippines, Erdogan in Turkey, and Trump in the United States. But the time to act is now.

The future is ours to make. Make it with friends new and old, in organizations large and small, networked locally and globally.

February 28, 2019

Other Democracies: The Yellow Vest Movement in France.


The protests against austerity policies in France that blossomed into the Yellow Vest movement in November, 2018 present challenges to those who still carry faith in electoral democracy.  While initially centering on fuel taxes, participants also are demanding raises to the minimum wage and the rollback of recent tax cuts for the wealthy and other pro-business policies.

Like other protests by the poor against pro-business policies that have bloomed across the world for decades, these protests against fuel price rises push back against neoliberal economic policies.  Although the Macron government argues the fuel price tax increase was to move the French economy towards a greener economy, French truck drivers, secretaries, care workers, and others with no room in their budgets are forced to pay costs they cannot bear. This is the cost of living in an electoral state where the leadership is not interested in popular opinion, but in its own narrow interests.

The history of policies generous to the rich and attacking the poor in France and many other economies worldwide often produces protest from the poor. But when do electoral democracies listen to the poor?

The difference of the Yellow Vest movement in France from many other protest movements is its lack of a center. This is a structure for democratic demand that does not replicate the centralized hierarchies of electoral governments, an organizing tactic that produces other politics. The turn away from centralization and towards openness to many constituents and viewpoints characterizes many political practices, what we term “Other Democracies.”

Commentators who are only familiar with centalized organizations assume that the Yellow Vest movement will be overtaken by already established political parties. This shows that commentators are not familiar with non-party movements, and can only conceive of politics in the narrow terms offered by electoral party policits. Yet the Yellow Vest movement has refused to align itself with established political parties, since they recognize the danger of participation in a centralized system tilted towards social elites.

The success of French democracy hangs in the balance of this struggle over public discussion.

Other struggles in Europe against neoliberalism, such as the Greek anti-austerity movement of 2010-2015 and the 2011 indignado movement in Spain, have shown the costs of allowing a popular movement to morph into political party activism. Austerity policies have continued apace after both of these movements were captured by political parties, and the pressures on low-wage workers, the unemployed, the disabled, and even the middle-class have not been reduced significantly.


One strategy of the privatization and wealth redistribution upwards policies known as neoliberalism or austerity is to attack public spaces. Presenting private spaces, such as shopping streets, mini-malls, and megastores, as gathering places for the public makes it more difficult for the public to do the important business of discussing urgent concerns. These privatized spaces displace citizenry roles to make roles as consumers more central in the life of the public.

The yellow vest movement members claims on traffic circles as meeting places revived the important activity in any democracy of a discussing those topics of concern for citizens.  When austerity policies remove safety nets ensuring all can meet basic needs and place intense pressures on the public, citizens would respond in any full democracy with discussion of how to meet basic needs and reduce the stresses of a lack of resources. So discussions in open, public spaces become important on a time frame driven not by parliamentary elections but by increasing pressure on the poor.

Macron’s attempts to reclaim public discussion and manage it to serve his own interests is an attempt to disrupt competing claims to represent the public’s interest by the Yellow Vest movement.  The smear tactics of sending in thugs and vandals to reduce public support for the Yellow Vest movement is an old tactic found since the nineteenth century in France (275-80), when the wealthy began using thugs to divide the poor and prevent mass movements.

Outside Europe similar struggles have led to different outcomes, as when multiple presidents were thrown out by popular meetings in public places in Argentina of 2001 and when the South Korean president was removed from office in 2017. Certainly Macron is aware of the high stakes, and will do whatever he can to remain in office.

Perhaps the greatest fear of those in command of electoral political systems is that they will lose their monopoly on the claim to represent the public. As Michel Foucault argued (271-88), unexpected associations of groups in horizontal solidarity is a major threat to the modern regime that enforces individuation in an effort to interrupt horizontal solidarities. Such horizontal solidarities were very successful in Europe between around 1780 and 1848, demanding accountability of political leaders to widespread concerns and changes in unequal distribution of wealth and political power.  These horizontal solidarities also attempted to disrupt actions of the wealthy that were harmful to common people, such as labor exploitation and the theft of family wealth through financial markets.

Democracy can thrive only when the urgent concerns of large social sectors are addressed by political leaders.  Yet electoral democracies in Europe and beyond have shown for decades that they are more responsive to the interests of the few than to the interests of the many. That is why structures for democratic practice other than the electoral state have long received wide support, even if these movements are overlooked by news commentators and policy experts.

October 30, 2018

Constitutional Governance as Democratic Travesty


                One defining characteristic of democracy for many political scientists is a constitution. Yet constitutions emerge from complex negotiations that give unequal advantages to social elites. How can democracy produce equality when those designing the governance structures have unequal advantages in wealth, education, experience negotiating, networks of allies in powerful places, and in other ways?  For these reasons most constitutions are written to respond to certain interests: not the interest of the people, but specific group interests that weaken democracy as equalized political power.
                The historical processes out of which constitutional agreements emerge often weaken the rule of ordinary people in order to give advantages to powerful groups. Obvious examples of these advantages include the modern British House of Lords and other parliamentary bodies beholden to wealthy social sectors, the success of wealthy elites in gaining elected office after national liberation across much of Africa and Asia, the influence of propertied white males in the early U.S. constitutional system, and the importance of wealthy merchants in nineteenth century French negotiations of constitutional reforms.
Even seemingly small factors may have outsized impacts on democratic practice. One such apparently small change was the adoption of James Madison’s proposal to enlarge U.S. House of Representative districts when the constitution was drafted in the 1780s. The enlarged districts made it unaffordable for all but a wealthy minority to afford the cost of campaigns and time away from work to travel throughout the larger districts, making it impossible for ordinary citizens to be elected to Congress.
Some of these same factors are at work in constitutional electoral democracies in our own day. Since the election of two presidents that lost the vote in the United States over the last twenty years, there has been increased discussion of reforming the electoral college, the mechanism that made their election possible. The increasing flood of corporate monies into campaign coffers in the U.S. after the Citizens United Supreme Court decision of 2010 continues the outsized influence of the wealthy that has plagued constitutional democracies since their founding.
One of the risks of democracies is the willingness to accept anti-democratic practices, political parties, groups and organizations, and individuals as part of democratic institutions. By claiming to represent the will of the people across large bodies, such as big states or nation-states, some are represented who do not share the goals of serving all members of the body politic. Many examples of political parties and individuals who have succeeded in electoral systems only to postpone, cancel, or even ignore elections and electoral mechanisms can be found as evidence.
The right has also begun implementing a new tactic known as “parliamentary coups” across Latin America. This practice is identified with impeachments of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay three years later, and more recently Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, These removals of democratically elected governments, generally of administrations that are reformist, are often carried out with little evidence of wrongdoing.
The Paraguay removal of President Lugo was received negatively by other governments in the region, and Paraguay was removed from the Mercosur pact as a result. In the Brazilian case, the administration that replaced Rousseff was made up of congressional representatives that included some with openly anti-democratic positions, including one recently elected as Brazil’s new President, Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro not only announced publicly that he would be willing to shut down Congress, but also that he openly advocates torture even when it was well-known that President Rousseff had been tortured as a young person.
The power of elected leaders to appoint court justices in constitutional systems is sometimes seen as an anti-democratic mechanism, since it shields the justices from recall by popular vote. Court support of voter-suppression laws and gerrymandering strengthens partisan groups that do not have the general interest in mind. Supreme court justices appointed by minority presidents also present the impression of minority rule rather than democratic rule by the will of the entire political body.
                Those who believe that constitutional democracies are the pinnacle of democratic governance may find these recent developments across the Americas to be unsettling signs of a decline in the democratic spirit. Some may even find them to be morbid signs of the decline and even death of democracy in some cases. Some may hope for a resurgence in the democratic impulse of particular groups of citizens at some undetermined future date. Some may despair that ordinary citizens will ever claim full power to govern their own affairs in the unending wait for political elites to give up their stranglehold on the constitutional mechanisms of electoral power.
                Yet those who design constitutions do not always have democratic rule by the people as their goal. The opening remarks at the beginning of the U.S. constitutional convention in 1787 by then governor of Virginia, Edmund Randolph, make this clear: “Our chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. It is a maxim which I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government exercised by the people swallows up the other branches.” This statement may help us understand why the popular electoral character of the presidency and congress was balanced by a branch of government that is not popularly elected, the judicial branch.
                Those who have less faith in constitutions than most political scientists may then wish to look elsewhere for stronger guarantees than those found in constitutions. There are important defense systems in democratic government that come from outside the constitutional systems. These defenses work against the narrow interests that so often gain monopoly control on the mechanisms of constitutional governance, what Derrida calls its autoimmune character.
Some of these defenses require constitutional systems but many of which do not. These defenses require an ability of democracies to defer themselves, to make a path for democracy “as the turn of a detour, as a path that is turned aside, as adjournment in the economy of the same.” They also require difference “as reference or referral to the other…as the undeniable…experience of the alterity of the other of heterogeneity, of the singular, the not-same, the different, the dissymmetric, the heteronomous.”
                These developments in democracies are not abstractions, but practices. They are not theories or applications, but experiences of the other, of that which is not democracy, not governance by all, but also not oligarchy or autocracy or plutocracy or other established others of the democratic. What they mean for democracy is found only in the future, in the time when deferral comes to fruition and experience of alterity emerges. Whether electoral democracies have the flexibility and the wherewithal to successfully experience the not-same remains a standing question. Only time will tell whether those willing to experience the singular out beyond the end of the economy of the same can overcome constitutional guarantees of narrow interests and strengthen the rule of the people to carry the day.