The transition
from a government of rotating elected officials subject to the will of voters
to autocratic government is a slippery slope. Once government officials begin
to allow narrow interests prevail over policies that benefit the general
public, the slide downwards into oligarchy, demagoguery, and the death of democracy can be
rapid.
President
Putin’s decision to disband
the Russian government and begin a transition to new political system
earlier this month appears to be one such step in the direction of the end of
democratic governance. While holding regular elections in the post-Soviet era,
Russia may seem to be an electoral democracy.
Yet the presence of elections, even
elections certified as valid by international bodies, is never enough to
guarantee democracy. Indeed, the
presence of elections often hide different problems with democracy.
When electoral
democracies allow oligarchs to monopolize political systems, they run the risk
that the oligarchs will decide they don’t want to give up power. In Russia’s
case this year, Putin seems to be pursuing a permanent
political post for himself. Permanent office for political leaders mean the
death of democracy.
Those
who believe in Western European governance models and capitalist economies may
assume that this problem is limited to the recent history of Eastern European experience
with centralized socialism under the sway of the Soviet Union. For them, the
trouble begins and ends with one country, Russia, or even more narrowly with a
single individual, Vladimir Putin.
But many political theorists find
that all
centralized governments east and west are hampered by a larger, more
generalized problem. This problem is sometimes known as the state of exception,
to use the language of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt
argued that any government system where leaders can declare exceptions to
the rule of law risked ceding its sovereignty to individuals. In Schmitt’s view
this weakness made the modern liberal state vulnerable to capture by
individuals who pursued their own individual interests. Schmitt’s turn towards
nationalist socialism in Germany in response to this flaw in democracies led
him to support Nazi German policies. Others have responded to Schmitt's analysis of weaknesses in centralized democracies by turning away from political practices with centralized authority structures.
As Giorgio Agamben argued, this weakness
of democracy is pervasive, and not limited to conservative states or
European states or autocracies. The state of exception weakness suggests that all
liberal democracies are vulnerable. These weaknesses are important in the
United States as well, since many senior officials in U.S. administrative
positions studied Schmitt carefully. They have also impacted the United
States through the view of one of Schmitt’s followers, Friedrich Hayek, an
important architect of present-day highly centralized economic policies known
as neoliberalism.
Some have found this weakness at
work in the rapid assertion of executive authority under the Bush Administration
in the United States after
9/11, and in the Trump
administration more recently. While
some have argued that the U.S.
government is now an oligarchy and longer a democracy, it does seem clear
at this point that Trump clearly does not believe he
is limited by the rule of law.
One important weapon wielded to ensure
subjection of the head of state to the rule of law in a constitutional
democracy is the impeachment process. By placing this weapon in the hands of
the legislative branch, those democracies which practice impeachment give the
people's elected representatives a counter weight to the individual sovereign, the executive branch. In
general concept, impeachment means the people can rule, rather than the monarch or
dictator.
Keeping the balance of power tilted
in the direction of the people takes hard work in all democracies. As Hakim
Jeffries, Representative from Brooklyn, pointed out when he made the analogy
with Putin in Russia explicit in his opening remarks to the U.S.
impeachment process, this problem is found not only in the United States but
also in Russia and Turkey and other nation-states that claim to be democracies.
Yet impeachment is not without its
perils. Sovereigns can use legal arguments to provide a cover for those elected officials who support oligarchy and autocracy. As one Representative, Tom Railsback of Illinois, argued during
preparations for the 1974 impeachment of President Nixon argued, “If the
Congress doesn’t get the material we think we need and then votes
to exonerate, we’ll be regarded as a paper tiger.” The risk of the current circumstances
in the United States is that President Trump’s allies in the U.S. Senate will
acquit him of wrongdoing, strengthening his chances of remaining in office for
four more years. Demanding that a sovereign submit to the rule of law and then failing to enforce the demand would be devastating to any democracy.
History reminds us that four more
years on a slippery slope may be a long ride downhill, from the foothills of
democracy into the valley of autocracy. President Trump’s ally in Russia,
President Putin, may be in the middle of demonstrating how to take a large
nation-state on a long ride into the darkness of leaders without elections, government
without rule of law, and a social order that does not respond to the will of
the people.
If impeachment does not remove
President Trump, there are many other weapons useful in reclaiming democracy from
oligarchs, autocrats, sovereigns, and dictators. How-to handbooks at carrying
out mass movements successful at removing oligarchs and autocrats from power in
the past year have been presented this year in Lebanon
and Algeria,
to name just two struggles. Other how-to guides might be seen in street battles
that have fought major national governments to a draw in China
and France.
Democracy is never handed to the
people. They must fight to claim their governments as their own, to claim rule
by the demos, rule by all, not rule by the few, rule by experts.
However the ongoing battle turns
out over democracy and the rule of law in the United States, centralized democracies
will retain their weakness for exceptions to the rule of law. So those who
might want to defend democracy will continue to have reason to fight for rule
by all, meetings to go to, and work
to do.
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