Building on Plato’s two theses about democracy, Badiou suggests democracy can be viewed as both a form of government (the state), and mode of subject-construction (the democrat). But, according to Badiou, the fundamental question at the heart of the democratic government—at heart of all of its state structures—is “of what objective space, of what settled collectivity, is democracy a democracy.” In other words, over what constituency does democracy govern? His answer: (D)emocrats. Therefore, since the democrat is at the heart of democracy-as-government, Badiou suggests we look for democracy at the subjective impact of this state rather than at its objective state status; he proposes a shift in focus from the legal framework of democracy to the democrat.
For Baudiou, democrats believe that freedom is the most essential human quality (rights, the opportunity for privilege, and even the chance to fulfill desire) and that democracy is really the only structure capable of letting humans fully exercise this essential trait. Democracy is defined as a particular relation between freedom and equality; that is, democracy is actually the “freedom” to “dispense an artificial equality of sorts among the equal and the unequal.” The democrat is the kind of subject produced in a democratic state, born from the illusion that everything is available equally.
Following from this platonic divide between government and subject, Badiou advances three motifs particular to democracy: First, the absence of world. For both Plato and Badiou, “a world” must be defined by the differences, traits, and truths it affirms. But since the only truth democracy affirms is the freedom to value and pursue all things truths equally, no such traits and differences can be determined. Badiou calls this form of democracy, following Plato, anarchic. In other words, objects are given value because of their place in a system of meaning. It is therefore anarchic, or rebellious to mechanically attribute equal value to what is not valuable, regardless of system of meaning. A world without any logic of its own—or only a logic that affirms absolute substitutability (the principle that any desire, goal, or power can be substituted for anything else)—is not a “world” in this Platonic sense. Democracy defines itself against what it is not properly a world—the zones of “war, hunger, walls, and delusions.” States that do allow their citizens the “freedom” of substitutionary desire are restricting their humanness and are, therefore, somehow not quite states in the proper sense.
The Second motif has to do with what Badiou calls the “democratic emblem” –or the fundamental and uncontestable idea that grounds a symbolic system—the thought without which the system would either change essentially or no longer make sense. For Badiou, the democratic emblem is “subjectivity enslaved to circulation.” In other words the subject of democracy (the democratic subject), that is, the democrat, comes to exist as a political entity within the matrices of “desire,” “objects of desire,” and “cheap thrills” that produced when democracy exercises its right to dispense equality to everything. The democrat, the kind of person created by democracy, is created not by the particular desires themselves, but by the ceaseless vacillation of desire, positing the freedom to desire as the essential human trait.
Because total substitutability does not allow stagnation or rigidity, but always pursues the new, the next, the best, Badiou suggests the third motif of democracy is the imperative for progress and “the imperative of universal adolescent pleasure seeking.” Democracy operates on the assumption that each democrat is utterly free to desire and pursue any one thing as equally as any other. The democrat (or democratic subject) is therefore constituted as a subject by its ability to substitute any one desire for any other desire. For Badiou, this includes the desire to have freedom from or over aging and time. So the ideal figure of the democrat is always the adolescent youth, with his drive to satisfy his desires and to progress and constantly change. Consequently the wisdom that comes with age, finally suggesting that some desires and goals are better than others, is never reached, and democracies core remains the constant equality and substitutability of all desires (defined as the decision not to come to decisions, but to always vacillate). - Rebekah Sinclair
References:
For Baudiou, democrats believe that freedom is the most essential human quality (rights, the opportunity for privilege, and even the chance to fulfill desire) and that democracy is really the only structure capable of letting humans fully exercise this essential trait. Democracy is defined as a particular relation between freedom and equality; that is, democracy is actually the “freedom” to “dispense an artificial equality of sorts among the equal and the unequal.” The democrat is the kind of subject produced in a democratic state, born from the illusion that everything is available equally.
Following from this platonic divide between government and subject, Badiou advances three motifs particular to democracy: First, the absence of world. For both Plato and Badiou, “a world” must be defined by the differences, traits, and truths it affirms. But since the only truth democracy affirms is the freedom to value and pursue all things truths equally, no such traits and differences can be determined. Badiou calls this form of democracy, following Plato, anarchic. In other words, objects are given value because of their place in a system of meaning. It is therefore anarchic, or rebellious to mechanically attribute equal value to what is not valuable, regardless of system of meaning. A world without any logic of its own—or only a logic that affirms absolute substitutability (the principle that any desire, goal, or power can be substituted for anything else)—is not a “world” in this Platonic sense. Democracy defines itself against what it is not properly a world—the zones of “war, hunger, walls, and delusions.” States that do allow their citizens the “freedom” of substitutionary desire are restricting their humanness and are, therefore, somehow not quite states in the proper sense.
The Second motif has to do with what Badiou calls the “democratic emblem” –or the fundamental and uncontestable idea that grounds a symbolic system—the thought without which the system would either change essentially or no longer make sense. For Badiou, the democratic emblem is “subjectivity enslaved to circulation.” In other words the subject of democracy (the democratic subject), that is, the democrat, comes to exist as a political entity within the matrices of “desire,” “objects of desire,” and “cheap thrills” that produced when democracy exercises its right to dispense equality to everything. The democrat, the kind of person created by democracy, is created not by the particular desires themselves, but by the ceaseless vacillation of desire, positing the freedom to desire as the essential human trait.
Because total substitutability does not allow stagnation or rigidity, but always pursues the new, the next, the best, Badiou suggests the third motif of democracy is the imperative for progress and “the imperative of universal adolescent pleasure seeking.” Democracy operates on the assumption that each democrat is utterly free to desire and pursue any one thing as equally as any other. The democrat (or democratic subject) is therefore constituted as a subject by its ability to substitute any one desire for any other desire. For Badiou, this includes the desire to have freedom from or over aging and time. So the ideal figure of the democrat is always the adolescent youth, with his drive to satisfy his desires and to progress and constantly change. Consequently the wisdom that comes with age, finally suggesting that some desires and goals are better than others, is never reached, and democracies core remains the constant equality and substitutability of all desires (defined as the decision not to come to decisions, but to always vacillate). - Rebekah Sinclair
References:
- “The Democratic Emblem,” in Democracy in What State. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
- “Democracy, Politics and Philosophy.” Lecture at European Graduate School EGS, Saas Fee, Switzerland. 2006. Transcription by Marcus Leis Allion. (URL: http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/democracy-politics-and-philosophy/)
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