Most basically, Jacques Derrida's thesis is that enactment of a democratic political state must, in some fundamental ways, undermine the very principles of democracy upon which it is founded. The paradox of democracy is this: democracy is, by definition, necessarily always open to it’s other, to non-democracy. Democracy, as the direct will of the people, contains the possibility that you could actually vote for the end of democracy. If democracy is truly democratic, then it must be open to the democratic election of a new form of government, or the democratic cessation of democracy. The alternative to democracy, or criticisms of democracy can be held within democracy. Democracy thus only and always exists in and as this tension between its idea and its realization.
This tension cannot be "corrected" but instead defines the very terrain of political judgment and responsibility.
Because of this, democracy is neither a state of governance, nor the person such governance governs (the democrat), but rather the tension between the idea of democracy (as completely free society), and it’s realization (which might turn on itself, and end democracy). Derrida likens democracy to autoimmunity—when there is no longer a binary between self and other, but the thing that undermines you is actually part of the self.
Practically then, in order to protect itself against it’s own end, in order to remain democratic, democracy must become undemocratic and protect itself through exclusion--especially the exclusion of those whose vote or voice could be seen to threaten the democratic principles (Rogues, 36). This is because, at the same time, democracy is said to represent two opposing forces: the force of the masses, the majority and greatest number of an age, but also the weakest of the weak, the smallest number, minorities, the poor and all those “throughout the world who call out in suffering for a legitimately infinite extension of what are called human rights” (36). “Democracy protects itself and maintains itself precisely by limiting and threatening itself” (36).
As an example of this, Derrida looks at Algeria. In 1992, the sovereign majority of the Algerian population decided to suspend the democratic and electoral processes precisely so that democracy could not be voted against, voted out, in the following election. Derrida states: “Must a democracy leave free and in a position to exercise power those who risk mounting an assault on democratic freedoms and putting an end to democratic freedom in the name of democracy of the majority that they might actually be able to rally round to their cause? Who, then, can take it upon him or herself, and with what means, to speak from one side or another of this front, of democracy itself, of authentic democracy properly speaking, when it is precisely the concept of democracy itself, in its uni-vocal and proper meaning, that is presently and forever lacking?” (Rogue, 34). Again, for Derrida, democracy lives in the in-between—in the space between its actualization and the ideal. - Rebekah Sinclair
References:
This tension cannot be "corrected" but instead defines the very terrain of political judgment and responsibility.
Because of this, democracy is neither a state of governance, nor the person such governance governs (the democrat), but rather the tension between the idea of democracy (as completely free society), and it’s realization (which might turn on itself, and end democracy). Derrida likens democracy to autoimmunity—when there is no longer a binary between self and other, but the thing that undermines you is actually part of the self.
Practically then, in order to protect itself against it’s own end, in order to remain democratic, democracy must become undemocratic and protect itself through exclusion--especially the exclusion of those whose vote or voice could be seen to threaten the democratic principles (Rogues, 36). This is because, at the same time, democracy is said to represent two opposing forces: the force of the masses, the majority and greatest number of an age, but also the weakest of the weak, the smallest number, minorities, the poor and all those “throughout the world who call out in suffering for a legitimately infinite extension of what are called human rights” (36). “Democracy protects itself and maintains itself precisely by limiting and threatening itself” (36).
As an example of this, Derrida looks at Algeria. In 1992, the sovereign majority of the Algerian population decided to suspend the democratic and electoral processes precisely so that democracy could not be voted against, voted out, in the following election. Derrida states: “Must a democracy leave free and in a position to exercise power those who risk mounting an assault on democratic freedoms and putting an end to democratic freedom in the name of democracy of the majority that they might actually be able to rally round to their cause? Who, then, can take it upon him or herself, and with what means, to speak from one side or another of this front, of democracy itself, of authentic democracy properly speaking, when it is precisely the concept of democracy itself, in its uni-vocal and proper meaning, that is presently and forever lacking?” (Rogue, 34). Again, for Derrida, democracy lives in the in-between—in the space between its actualization and the ideal. - Rebekah Sinclair
References:
- “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. Translated by Mary Quaintance. Edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, And the new International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York – London: Routledge, 1994.
- Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins. London – New York: Verso, 1997.
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